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Introduction: 
 
In his short essay to accompany the publication of Robin Soans’s verbatim 
play Talking to Terrorists, David Hare describes the resurgence of verbatim  
- or to use Hare’s terminology  - ‘factual’ theatre as ‘[offering] authentic 
news of overlooked thought and feeling’ (Hare in Soans 2005:112 my italics). 
For Hare, like many other practitioners and commentators of verbatim and 
documentary theatre, the use of the term ‘authenticity’ in the context of 
theatre equates to a yearning for greater honesty, truthfulness and 
importantly, a greater correspondence to reality. The focus on verbatim 
interviews promises a more direct and authentic access to actual lived 
experience and it is this desire for a more unmediated access to what is 
‘real’ that seems to lie behind Hare’s call for a ‘return to realism’ (Hare in 
Soans 2005: 112) leading him to ask: 
 
Why can’t we just admit that theatre using real people has become a 
fabulously rich and varied strand which, for many years has been 
pumping red cells into the dramatic blood stream? (Hare in Soans 
2005:113).  
 
While I agree with Hare that theatre derived from real people’s stories and 
actual lived events offers a refreshingly new perspective and insight into 
‘overlooked’ situations, in this article I question whether it is the truth 
claims of this kind of work that guarantees its authenticity. Hare’s ‘factual 
theatre’ appears to derive its status of authenticity from its faithful 
adherence to actuality and reality.  Yet I would argue that the testimony of 
traumatised subjects, which verbatim theatre exploits, places great 
pressure on such literalist construals of truth and authenticity.  The ‘truth’ 
of the traumatic event is arguably not transparent, knowable or even 
communicable.  Rather, trauma is, by definition, that which ‘resists simple 
comprehension’ (Caruth 1996: 6) and can perhaps best be understood as a 
radical break or rupture in our understanding of what it means to be in the 
world.  To suggest then that the ‘authenticity’ of verbatim theatre which 
deals with trauma can be explained simply by its capacity to be truthful, not 
only overlooks the problem trauma presents to this kind of representational, 
and dramaturgically literalist form of theatre: it also places limitations on 
theatre’s capacity to respond authentically to real stories of trauma.  
 
In what follows, I will argue that to fully comprehend what is at stake, 
dramaturgically, in the context of ‘real life’ stories of trauma, we should 
set aside standard conceptions of truth (such as correspondence theories or 
adequacy to the facts) and instead consider a more existentially nuanced 
articulation of truth grasped as ‘authenticity’. One such model that provides 
a possible route to do this is Martin Heidegger’s account of being-towards-
death.  In Heidegger’s interpretation of authenticity we find that what is at 
stake is not factual veracity, but fidelity to the very conditions of our own 
 2 
existence.  Using a Heideggerian-based account of authenticity, then, I hope 
to consider some possibilities for a testimonial theatre which enables us to 
comprehend what authenticity and truth might mean in the context of 
narratives of trauma.  
 
It should be said, however, that this kind of interpretation is not without 
controversy - and not least because Heidegger’s account of authenticity 
could be seen to invoke highly romantic notions of selfhood which, in 
abandoning ‘truth’, would appear to relinquish any critical purchase on the 
world (see Guignon 2004i).  Notwithstanding the legitimacy of such 
objections, there are alternative interpretations to consider.  For instance, 
Taylor Carman argues against this view, by suggesting that for Heidegger 
authenticity is not about being true to oneself, or about ‘self expression’, 
but is instead about coming to terms with my own death and finitude. To 
live authentically Dasein ii must come to terms with its own existence and in 
doing so, be open to the radical closing down of possibilities that death 
precipitates. To exist authentically, Dasein must in Carman’s terms ‘[own] 
up wholly – that is, wholeheartedly – to itself in its existence.’ (Carman 
2003:276).  
 
Now, although Soans’s play honours the factual ‘truth’ of the stories that he 
was told, I would argue that the play represents something of a missed 
opportunity rather than being a ‘[revolution] in art’ (Hare in Soans 2005: 
112). The stories we are told in Talking to Terrorists are often horrific, 
brutal and ‘true’. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how these accounts 
penetrate the act of terrorism itself.  Certainly what is clear from the play 
is that terrorism is a violent, messy and often traumatising affair for all 
involved.  Yet beyond the word-for-word re-telling of personal stories of 
terrorism, the play seems to struggle to move beyond the simplistic message 
that: ‘all terrorism is bad and therefore we shouldn’t do it’. It neither 
penetrates the trauma or the act of terrorism; nor does it disclose any 
insight into the politics of these situations or what motivates someone to 
commit themselves to act in this way. However, I would suggest that this 
outcome is hardly surprising. For despite the meticulous research that Soans 
undertook, methodologically verbatim theatre is ultimately self-limiting. 
The verbatim playwright’s pursuance of factual truth and the fidelity to the 
word-for-word interview ultimately prescribes a truth of verbatim theatre 
where facts legitimate what it means to speak of the truth. This points to 
the limitation of verbatim theatre because it struggles to take account of 
other ‘truths’, truths such as testimonial or traumatic truth that fail to be 
disclosed by a literal and factual account of ‘what happened’.  
 
However, if we dig deep into testimonies of trauma it is often precisely at 
the point where language and explication fails that the subject gains 
profound – even revelatory – insight not only into the situation that has been 
lived through but also existentially into what it means to be in the world. 
Indeed, I would argue that trauma has the capacity to throw the subject 
into what we might describe as the liminal space of survival.    For the 
survivor of trauma bears witness not only to what has been lived through 
and what has been endured but also to the possibility of their own non-
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survival, and therefore to the potential structural closure of their own finite 
possibilities. It is this liminality that can precipitate what following 
Heidegger we might call an authentic seizing of one’s own existence. In this 
way I agree with Robert Stolorow who suggests that: 
 
Trauma … [plunges] the traumatized person, in Heidegger’s terms, 
into a form of authentic Being-toward-death….through which 
authentic Being-toward-death is disclosed (Stolorow 2007: 41). 
 
Of course arguably verbatim theatre is not necessarily concerned with 
existential questions about existence and there is validity in a journalistic 
verbatim theatre which draws attention to the factual truths of a situation 
that were hitherto hidden from us by the media.  Yet the question trauma 
poses to this kind of theatre is by no means obviated by verbatim theatre’s 
fidelity to fact  – so we still need to ask: how can dramaturgy engage with 
the aporia of an experience which is irreducible to the facts of a situation?  
And in what way can theatre stand as an authentic examination of the 
existential crisis of trauma?  To answer these questions we need to first look 
more closely at the problem trauma poses to a dramaturgical strategy that 
is constituted upon the re-performance of personal accounts of actual 
events.  
 
Trauma: its challenge to dramaturgy and the possibility of the disclosure 
of authenticity  
 
The term ‘trauma’, deriving from the Greek meaning ‘wound’ is often 
confused with the situation that has precipitated trauma, for example 
conflict, mass murder,  genocideiii. In other words, the concept of trauma 
does not define a concrete situation, however horrific it is.  Rather, it 
speaks of the subject’s struggle to come to terms with events that have 
been lived through, but which can not be fully processed or absorbed into 
experience. Trauma then can be understood as a ‘breach’ in the processes 
of cognition with which we ordinarily experience and make sense of the 
world. Cathy Caruth, following Freud, for instance, has defined trauma as a 
‘wound inflicted not upon the body but upon the mind […] a breach in the 
mind’s experience of time, self, and the world’ ( Caruth 1996: 3 - 4). It is 
because of this inassimilability into experience that trauma can thereby be 
said to stand radically beyond language and communicability.  In Lacan’s 
terms it is an encounter with the real that is always already  a ‘missed 
encounter’ ( Lacan 1994:55), for trauma  ruptures the symbolic and the 
imaginary structures that assimilate me to the world; that is, the traumatic, 
for Lacan, is ultimately always already postponed and unknowable, refusing  
cognition and the absorption into experience. However, even this is 
misleading for what is at stake in trauma is not just the relatively prosaic 
psychological point that concerns my incapacity to come to terms with 
something bad that has happened to me.  Seen in Heideggerian terms, the 
rupture of the symbolic and the failure of language also discloses that which 
is radically ‘mine’ – specifically, what ‘trauma’ reveals, is the certainty of 
my own death.  In doing so, trauma brings the conditions of my (in)existence 
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into sharp relief and, to pursue the Heideggerian thought further, opens up 
the possibility of authentically being in the world,  as Stolorow’s elucidates:  
 
‘Trauma shatters the absolutisms of everyday life […] the illusions 
[that allow us to] evade and cover up the finitude, contingency, and 
embeddedness of our existence and the indefiniteness of its certain 
extinction.( Stolorlow 2007: 41). 
 
Trauma is therefore best conceived as a limit experience, since it can 
neither be articulated nor comprehended within experience.  On the 
contrary, it is the point at which experience confronts its ownmost 
impossibility.iv  
 
Nevertheless, I would also add the following caveat: despite the general 
agreement amongst commentators that in Leigh Gilmore’s terms ‘language 
fails in the face of trauma, and that trauma mocks languages and confronts 
it with its insufficiency’ (Gilmore 2001: 6) - what remains after the event of 
trauma, are those who have witnessed it.  This is the paradox of trauma: for 
even though trauma might elude language and communicability, many 
survivors of trauma speak of the need or indeed the compulsion to testify 
and to make other people aware of what has been lived through. The 
challenge trauma places upon verbatim theatre, then, concerns the problem 
of  how a dramaturgical strategy, constituted on the promise of direct 
communicable experience, can authentically engage with that which stands 
radically beyond language – that is to say, it is the problem of how theatre 
can respond to stories of trauma without being ‘mocked’ for its 
‘insufficiency’ ( Gilmore 2001:6). 
 
In the following section I will look at two case studies that use different 
dramaturgical approaches to explore two real events of trauma. The first 
text uses verbatim theatre techniques whilst the second the dramaturgy of 
testimonial theatre. I acknowledge that both plays are informed by very 
different artistic intentions and methodologies, but by looking at these texts 
in this way I hope to show how the dramaturgy of testimonial theatre can 
enable the testifying subject to penetrate the ‘truth’ of trauma and 
potentially open up the possibility of revelation and insight. Furthermore, 
through this examination of these two plays I hope to show how a re-
articulation of authenticity, informed by Heidegger’s account of being-
towards death, can allow us to understand how the truth of trauma can be 
disclosed by a dramaturgy that is less concerned with factual truth and 
instead embraces the poetic and the metaphoric.  
 
The Exonerated  (Blank and Jensen: 2006) and He Left Quietly (Farber: 
2008) are two plays which tell the story of what might be defined as the 
encounter with a missed death since in both plays we meet real individuals 
who were sentenced to death for crimes they did not commit. The 
Exonerated tells six such stories and is a verbatim play which is constructed 
solely by using transcribed interviews and other factual material.  He Left 
Quietly by contrast is testimonial theatre and was created in 2003 by Farber 
in collaboration with Duma Kumalo, whose story the play tells. However, 
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unlike Blank and Jensen’s approach, Farber does not make use of 
transcribed interviews or factual material, nor does the play’s staging seek 
to evidence an objective, factual truth. Instead as we shall later see 
Farber’s approach is collaborative and processual, focussing more on an 
exploration of the subjectivity of Kumalo’s testimonial truth than on the re-
presentation of the facts of the case. Both plays are connected by the same 
theme of the trauma of wrongful arrest and the eventual death sentence 
that followed.  In this way, the individuals in both these plays undertake 
what Cathy Caruth describes as the ‘impossible and necessary double 
telling’ (Caruth 1996: 9) of the ‘oscillation between a crisis of death and the 
correlative crisis of life’ ( 7). The subjects who stand before us not only 
speak of the traumatic encounter with the imminence of their own death 
but also, following reprieve - albeit in different ways and so to different 
dramatic effect - address what Cathy Caruth describes as ‘the unbearable 
nature of [...] survival’ ( 7), testifying to that which has to be  endured  and 
what has been irrevocably lost as a result.  
 
 
The Exonerated (Blank and Jensen 2006) 
 
The Exonerated is a verbatim play generated from a series of sixty 
interviews undertaken with ‘exonerated’ people from across the United 
States who were sentenced to death for murders they didn’t commit. In the 
play we encounter six individual accounts of the trauma of incarceration 
and eventual exoneration and release.  Playwrights Jessica Blank and Erik 
Jensen present us with a text generated from interviews and supplemented 
with other material gathered from ‘court transcripts and case files’ (Blank 
and Jensen 2006: 8).  
 
In the introduction to The Exonerated, the playwrights inform us that ‘With 
a few exceptions, each word spoken in this play comes from public record – 
legal documents, court transcripts, letters – or from an interview with an 
exonerated person’ ( Blank and Jensen 2006: 8 – 9).  Certainly, from the 
moment the play commences everything about the choice of staging and the 
performance style of the actors seems designed to remind us that what we 
are hearing is the literal ‘truth’. Throughout the play the actors remain 
seated behind lecterns which hold the script to the play. A device which 
leads one reviewer for the New York Times to speak of ‘readers’ rather than 
‘actors’ and to comment on the line-learning capacity of the cast, he 
writes: ‘ Many of the readers have obviously memorized their roles, to 
which they bring a hypnotic and seemingly ego-free focus’ (Brantley 2002). 
This ‘performance’ of script reading seems intended to signify that the 
actors are not really acting, or rather that they are not adopting a character 
as such. Instead we are invited to perceive these non-actorly actors as 
‘intermediaries’ for the voice of the person they are speaking on behalf of. 
Of course from a pragmatic perspective the material presence of the script 
also allows for a quick change over of cast. Certainly, the actors who play 
each of the exonerated people change regularly, and in productions of the 
play both in the UK and the United States many ‘celebrity’ actors such as 
Catherine Tate, Alanis Morrisette and Robin Williams have stepped in to play 
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a role. These different strategies combine to generate a curiously detached 
mode of performance and convinces reviewer Terry Stoller of the play’s 
claims of actuality and veracity. For Stoller the presence of celebrity actors 
‘creates a distance between performer and character so that the audience 
is always aware that the actor is giving voice to the testimony of real 
people’ (Stoller 2003: 346-347).  
 
Certainly, it seems that a sense of ‘distance’ between those who are 
enacted and the actors who enact is also of great importance to the 
playwrights. In the introduction to the playtext future directors and actors 
of the play are advised not to be ‘didactic’ and to ‘avoid 
overemotionalizing’ (Blank and Jensen 2006: 11). Here Blank and Jensen 
remind us that the characters in the play ‘have been exonerated for a 
numbers of years’ and ‘are telling their stories, not reliving them’ (11 their 
italics). The distinction between telling rather than reliving a story is an 
interesting one, especially in the context of a theatrical representation of 
an event of trauma. This ‘note’ of direction to the actor seems to be an 
attempt to fix the temporality of the events that the stories depict as taking 
place firmly in the past. This of course becomes problematic in the context 
of trauma, for theorists in this area such as psychiatrist Dori Laub, describe 
how trauma refuses to be confined neatly to the past and resists  ‘the 
parameters of “normal” reality, such as causality, sequence, place and 
time’ (Laub in Felman and Laub 1992: 69). Trauma could be said to collapse 
the usual chronological boundaries of time. It returns unbidden to disrupt 
the present while also radically re-aligning the subject’s vision of the 
future.  Indeed, the individuals that we meet in The Exonerated tell us that 
the trauma of death row has stayed with them and has unalterably changed 
them forever.  To give an example:  for ‘David’ it has taken away ‘that-
spark for life’ (Blank and Jensen 2006: 71) and for ‘Kerry’ it returns him 
regularly to the horror of imminent death, Kerry says:  
 
The state of Texas executed me over a thousand times, man, and it 
just keeps on doin’ it. I get nightmares – sometimes I forget I’m really 
here (72).  
 
Yet dramaturgically the play draws on a classical structure of beginning, 
middle and end and as such the stories we encounter are framed by the 
foreclosing of the end of the narrative which focuses on their eventual 
exoneration and release. Of course it is likely that this structure was utilised 
in the interviews undertaken by the playwrights with the individuals and 
within the other personal statements and juridical document that were used 
to generate the text. Certainly the basis for any interview about a 
significant experience is usually framed by the request to ‘tell me what 
happened, by starting at the beginning’.  Perhaps then the reason Blank and 
Jensen remind us that the characters in the play are retelling rather than 
reliving these stories is because the material they used to generate the play 
could only ever produce a chronological, factual and therefore somewhat 
‘distanced’ retelling of these events. After all, without access to a non-
literal mode of expression such as metaphor or poetry, how could the 
individuals who lived through this kind of life-shattering trauma ever hope 
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to authentically account for what has been lived through? If trauma is to be 
understood as Caruth describes as ‘not locatable in the simple violent or 
original event in an individual’s past but rather in the way that its very 
unassimilated nature… returns to haunt the survivor’ (Caruth 1996: 4) how 
could any account of trauma be rendered ‘authentically’ by relying solely on 
the explicable, chronological language of a timebound interview? 
 
The character of Sonny is an interesting case in point. The facts of Jacobs’ 
story circulate around a series of traumatic events yet the account that is 
presented within the text struggles to move beyond a merely prosaic and 
factual retelling of it. Jacobs’s children were aged just 10 months and nine 
years old at the moment of her arrest. She was incarcerated for seventeen 
years. During this time her husband, who was also wrongly arrested at the 
same time as Jacobs, was electrocuted in the most brutal manner, as Jacobs 
explains in the play:  
 
The chair malfunctioned and made a mess of it. And … they had to 
pull the switch three times [….]It took thirteen and a half minutes for 
Jesse to die […] Until finally flames shot out from his head (Blank and 
Jensen 2006: 76).  
 
During her incarceration her parents, who were the primary carers for her 
children, died suddenly in a plane crash, leading Jacobs to remark in an 
interview for The Telegraph: ‘The day my parents died was the worst day of 
my life. I reached the depths of despair’ (Bryne 2006). Yet whilst it is clear 
from the details of Jacobs’s narrative that the loss of seventeen years of her 
life was profoundly disturbing, the ‘storied’ Sonny Jacobs, as presented in 
the play, struggles to speak of the magnitude of this loss or the impact of 
this on her life.  Instead much of the playtext is concerned with eliciting the 
factual details both of the alleged crimes and the other events that led to 
her arrest. Certainly there are moments where we encounter glimpses of 
the existential crisis precipitated by these events but on the whole, for the 
storied Jacobs, language seems inadequate to what she seems to wish to 
communicate. For example, she says: 
 
They tell you exactly how they’re gonna do it. They’re gonna send 
twenty-two hundred volts of electricity through your body until 
you’re dead. And then they ask you if you have anything to say to 
that, and really it’s kind of dumbfounding. So after the judge read 
the sentence, I just said, ‘Are you finished?’ I didn’t have anything to 
say. What do you say? How can you say anything to that? (Blank and 
Jensen 2006: 52). 
 
The moment when Jacobs came face to face with the brutal and factual 
imminence of her own death is clearly profoundly disturbing. Yet in Blank 
and Jensen’s retelling of this the storied Jacobs is afforded little possibility 
of poetic insight or reflection and is confined to relating a literal account of 
what took place. Ultimately, Blank and Jensen’s text simply replays Jacob’s 
sense of loss and bewilderment.  If the ‘real’ Sonny Jacobs felt speechless 
and unable to express herself in the face of her executioners, similarly the 
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storied Jacobs seems to stand somewhat ‘dumbfounded’ before her 
audience. Of course, following the structural methodology of verbatim 
theatre, the playwrights had little option here. For their ‘promise’ to their 
verbatim subjects and their audience was to tell the truth and to re-iterate 
only what they were told or what they retrieved from the documents they 
readv.  However, although the play draws our attention to the injustice of 
wrongful arrest and incarceration on death, there are limits to the extent to 
which the play fully penetrates these issues. For example, whilst the play is 
clear in its condemnation of the treatment of those who were innocent and 
incarcerated, it is not clear where the play stands in relation to those who 
are guilty and sentenced to death. In other words, the play fails to address 
the existential brutality of death row per se; instead it is limited to the 
factual stories of those who are exonerated. The stories we are told are 
used as evidence of a system’s failure rather than its inherent brutality and 
the detail of each individual’s account provides the proof or verification for 
how this injustice can happen. Certainly the self-professed aim of Blank and 
Jensen is for the play to speak for all those who have been exonerated, in 
the introduction of to they write:  
 
 At the time we conducted these interviews, there were eighty-nine 
people who had been exonerated from death row […] We consider 
every one of their stories to be part of this play. (9) 
 
In this way, the characters we are presented with in the play become 
emblematic of all those who have been exonerated – but the price it must 
pay is that of ultimately betraying the singularity of the stories that are 
depicted within it. It is this betrayal of the unique status of these personal 
accounts of trauma, I would argue, that discloses a crucial difference 
between the verbatim and testimonial theatre subject.  For the testimonial 
subject speaks only for him or herself. Testimony, as elucidated by 
Shoshana Felman is a ‘radically unique, noninterchangeable and solitary 
burden’ (Felman in Laub and Felman 1992: 30). Rather than attempting to 
recount the factual truth of the situation, in testimonial theatre we 
encounter the uncertainty and unknowingness of testimony. Instead of being 
tied to a chronological retelling of what happened by way of an interview or 
a court transcript, testimonial theatre enables a more meditative reflection 
on the magnitude of an event that has been lived through. Unlike verbatim 
theatre which assumes the communicability and the transparency of the 
traumatic event, testimonial theatre can acknowledge its opacity and allows 
for the subject’s unknowingness and the fragmentary way the testimonial 
subject encounters an event. While verbatim theatre could be described as 
being constitutively – that is to say, dramaturgically - incapable of engaging 
with the radical asymmetry of trauma, theatre of testimony uses poetry and 
metaphor to open up the possibility for an authentic reflection on how the 
resonance of trauma has transformed the life of the individual who has lived 
through it. One such example of a testimonial play that effectively opens up 
a profound and existential exploration of trauma is He Left Quietly, written 
by South African playwright Yael Farber in collaboration with and about the 
life of Duma Kumalo. 
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He Left Quietly ( Farber 2008): authentic attestation and being-towards-
death 
 
He Left Quietly tells the story of Duma Kumalo’s wrongful arrest and his 
subsequent sentencing to death for his ‘alleged participation in the mob 
killing of a town councillor in Sharpeville’ (Farber 2008: 181) in 1984. The 
case of the ‘Sharpeville Six’ became well known both in South Africa and 
beyond.  As a result of international pressure, in 1988 Kumalo received a 
stay of execution just hours before he was due to be hanged. He was 
subsequently released from prison several years later and met Farber at the 
Grahamstown festival, South Africa in 2001 when he was performing in his 
own play ‘The Story I am About to Tell’. Kumalo agreed to collaborate with 
Farber and together they went on to create He Left Quietly, in which 
Kumalo performed himself.  Rather than adopting verbatim theatre’s 
approach of using documents and transcribed interviews to piece together 
the evidence of the ‘case’ of Duma Kumalo’s wrongful arrest, Farber worked 
with Kumalo over a period of six weeks to develop a text that uses poetry, 
metaphor and vernacular language to bear witness to Kumalo’s testimony. 
The play does not open by establishing the facts that explain Kumalo’s 
story, instead Farber orchestrates a direct confrontation between Duma – as 
he’s known in the play - and his audience of listeners. As Duma enters the 
space and takes his seat before us he addresses his audience directly asking 
us to reflect on what it means to live and what it means to die. He says:  
 
When does the soul leave the body? …  At which precise moment?  
Does it leave with our last breath? … Or the final beat of our heart? 
Is it possible that I stayed here amongst you – the living – long after 
my soul quietly left my body behind? ( Farber 2008: 188) 
 
These reflections continue to haunt Duma’s story throughout the play. 
Farber’s dramaturgy resists a linear narrative and instead the play 
interweaves Duma’s account of life on death row with his memories of 
childhood, his dreams and his reflections on his existence and who he is 
now. In this way the ‘truth’ of the play corresponds less to factual veracity 
and instead creates a fragmented testimonial truth which in Shoshana 
Felman terms is:   
 
composed of bits and pieces of a memory that has been overwhelmed 
by occurrences that have not settled into understanding or 
remembrance, acts that cannot be constructed as knowledge nor 
assimilated into full cognition, events in excess of our frames of 
references (Felman in Laub and Felman 1992: 5).  
 
The incorporation of different languages ( Afrikaans, English and  Kumalo’s 
own vernacular) means that  the audience is never fully in possession of the  
truth of the play. Instead there are references and insights which are 
disclosed only to Kumalo and perhaps other members of his community. In 
this way the play respects the uniqueness and singularity of Duma Kumalo’s 
testimony; yet through its use of direct address and the existential framing 
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of the story, Duma draws his audience into a profound, exploration of what 
it means to be human and what it means to exist.  
 
Through his engagement with what could be defined as his own missed 
death Duma’s testimony discloses a ‘now’ that is neither the past, the 
present, nor the future. Instead the text reveals how he is repeatedly 
returned to the trauma of death row, Duma says: ‘I have never really come 
home […]  Every night, I am back there. Every night – I go home to Death 
Row’ (Farber 2008: 205).  The text then discloses a ‘traumatic now’ in 
which the events of Duma’s arrest and incarceration on death row 
reverberate through his attempt to grasp and take hold of his own 
existence.  
 
Indeed, it is in his attempts to testify to his own not-dying, that Duma 
comes face to face with what Blanchot, citing Heidegger, describes as ‘the 
possibility of impossibility’ of death (Blanchot 1995:70). For in his own 
missed death, Duma glimpses what one might call the structural finitude of 
existence. It is in that moment that I would like to suggest Duma attains 
insight into the only possible outcome of his life, and specifically into what I 
would call an authentic seizing of being-towards-death.  For what is at stake 
in the ‘traumatic now’ is nothing other than the opening up of the 
possibility of the impossibility of reconciling  himself to the end point of his 
own existence in which he is always already living to eventually die.  In 
other words, in his story of the trauma of death row, Duma explores the 
possibility and impossibility of his own death and his own non-dying, or in 
Derrida’s terms the ‘imminence, the instance of what will already have 
taken place’ (Derrida 2000: 49). In the play, Duma takes his audience again 
and again to the ungraspable moment of the imminence of his own death 
and the random instant of his own survival which attests to the visceral 
actuality of the deaths of others. 
 
Through the text’s engagement with the impossibility and possibility of 
survival, the storied Duma engages with what verbatim theatre fails to see 
in the essence of traumatic experience: that which eludes explanation or 
which is unknowable in its radical asymmetry. For while Duma is unable to 
speak to us from the instant of his own death, his performed testimony 
points to this encounter with his own finitude and all that follows when the 
imminence of death becomes an event that is missed. Rather than seeking 
to explicate the trauma of this moment, however, the text uses poetry to 
disclose glimpses of that which is unknowable and unsayable - and in this 
way, it allows Duma to approach that which would otherwise elude those 
who lived though death row.  
 
The truth that He Left Quietly discloses, then, is not an evidence-based 
claim of veracity that provides a correspondence with concrete fact. Instead 
it could be better understood as an ‘authentic’ truth that is disclosed 
through the testimonial act itself and discloses insight into the trauma of 
wrongful imprisonment and the brutality of death row. However, in order to 
more fully grasp our use of the term ‘authentic’ from  a Heideggarian 
perspective  we should perhaps re-appraise what is meant conceptually and 
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philosophically in our attempt to appropriate the term, as we saw Hare did 
earlier, within the context of theatrical representation.  It is to this 
question, that I would like to finally turn in conclusion. 
 
 
Trauma and the authenticity of insight: Heidegger’s being-towards-death 
 
As we have seen, for Heidegger, authenticity is about our capacity to come 
to terms with the structural finitude of existence, the inevitability of death 
and the closing down of possibilities that death precipitates.  By coming to 
terms with, or in Carman’s words ‘owning up wholly’ (Carman 2003:276, his 
italics) to my existential death, an authentic mode of being-in-the world is 
disclosed, Carman says:  
 
Indeed, Heidegger maintains that it is precisely in the face of its own 
death that Dasein  is capable of understanding itself wholly, or 
authentically (Carman 2003:276).  
 
This is because it is only through death and the possibility of my own death 
that I encounter an opening to the real significance of ‘mineness and 
existence’ (Heidegger in Carman 2003: 277).  In other words, death and 
existing as ‘being-towards-death’, according to this perspective, opens up 
the possibility of an authentic seizing of existence. It is death that 
individuates me and precisely insofar as death is non-substitutable – which is 
to say, existentially viewed, death is radically mine and no-one else’s.  As 
Taylor Carman explains:  
 
there is an essential asymmetry between my relation to the deaths of 
others and my relation to my own death, just as there are 
asymmetries between my relation to my own body and mind and the 
relation in which I stand to the bodies and minds of others (Carman 
2003: 277).  
 
What in my view makes He Left Quietly an extraordinary and poetic 
meditation on trauma is that it moves beyond the facts of Kumalo’s 
wrongful sentencing to death and considers what can be retrieved from an 
event of trauma.  In this way it poses questions of what insight can be 
disclosed from the event of trauma and how this can shape our 
comportment towards our existence within the world. For through the 
trauma of his incarceration Duma seems to seize upon the truth of his own 
existence. Moreover, just as for Heidegger, death prizes open one’s 
situation to the possibility of genuine choice, insofar as it discloses what 
most matters to me in the situation that confronts me, for Duma, as a result 
of the trauma of wrongful arrest and his own missed death he undergoes a 
transformation and relates to the world in a new and political way.  A 
significant example of this comes near the end of the play where we 
encounter a more politicised Duma who has been much changed by the 
events he has lived through. This is in contrast to the Duma we meet at the 
opening of the play, for prior to his arrest Duma tells us that: ‘[he] was 
never a political animal. Much happier to smoke Craven A, drink Castle 
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Lager, and spend time at the shebeen’vi ( Farber 2008: 192). Yet later in the 
play,  following his release,  Duma speaks not only of what it means to exist 
as being-towards-death, in a Heideggerian sense, but on the other hand,  he 
also addresses what it means to live as a black man under South Africa’s 
brutal apartheid regime.  He speaks of this in response to an important 
question asked by the character of ‘Woman’.   
 
Described by Farber as being ‘in her mid-thirties… white and 
nondescript’(Farber 287), ‘Woman’ could be interpreted as representing the 
white audience member, the listener of Duma’s testimony both in South 
Africa and beyond.  She says:  
 
‘what do we do after such knowledge?  I had asked [Duma]… 
We tell stories – he told me. We find the words for what can never be 
described.’ ( Farber 2008:234).  
 
In this moment of course, the ‘Woman’ acknowledges  both the limits of 
testimony  - that which ‘can never be described’ and the limits and 
responsibility of listening to testimony, asking us to consider what kind of 
demand is placed upon us by this testimonial performance.  
 
There is an interesting parallel here with the closure of The Exonerated at 
the Riverside Studios in 2006 and points to the different dramaturgical end-
points that verbatim and testimonial theatre lead us to. At the end of The 
Exonerated, perhaps in recognition of the audience’s desire to ‘do 
something’ in response to what they had heard, ushers gathered with 
buckets to collect donations to a cause, which I assumed (though this wasn’t 
made clear to me at the time) associated with the issues explored within 
the play. The audience filed out of the auditorium placing their money in 
the buckets as they did so. 
 
In He left Quietly the audience is not let off so lightly, rather than 
requesting some form of purgation of the audience’s conscience by way of a 
financial donation, Duma calls upon his to audience to recognise their own 
interconnections with his story. He responds to the Woman’s question, by 
reminding us of the need for solidarity and participation in the politics of a 
unjust situation, saying: 
 
This is our history. We all come from this broken place. 
Either you are in or you are out. But if you choose to be in – you must 
partake (Farber 2008:234). 
 
With these words, Duma acknowledges the limits of testimony, for while his 
testimonial performance may be attended by an audience, there is no 
guarantee that his listeners will hear what has been spoken. It is important, 
then, to note that testimony, by definition, requires someone to listen to it, 
but that there is no guarantee that the listener will not turn away and 
refuse to acknowledge or hear it.  Unlike verbatim theatre’s promise of a 
totalised, objective truth, testimonial theatre could better be understood as 
a leap of faith rather than the assurance of factual truth. When Duma asks 
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whether we are ‘in or out’ he places a demand upon his audience to reflect 
on how we can become implicated in this story and how we position 
ourselves in relation to this injustice.  
 
As the play ends Duma considers the future, yet in his final words he also 
acknowledges that the trauma of the past refuses to stay the past and will 
always be ‘present’ in the ‘now’ of South Africa’s future, he says: 
 
For we who survived must tell the world 
Outside, a new day is beginning in Pretoria, South Africa. 
And I am here to see it. 
I – Duma Joshua Kumalo 
Prisoner V 34-58 ( 238) 
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i The famous objection to Heidegger’s concept of truth comes from Ernst Tugendhat, for a 
discussion of this see Smith’s article in Inquiry: ‘Why Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger’s 
Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem ( 2007). For highly ‘expressivist’ 
interpretations of authenticity in Heidegger, see Charles Guignon’s interpretation of  being-
towards-death, which he understands as being true to oneself  and living one’s life story 
authentically and coherently,   Guignon says: 
‘ Heidegger holds that coming face to face with death […] open[s] the possibility of 
living one’s life as a coherent story. To face up to death is to see your life as a 
finite project, something that can and will be finished’ ( Guignon 2004: 133).  
Taylor Carman disagrees with Guignon’s interpretation, rejecting the notion of a coherent 
‘finite life span’ ( Carman  2003:272) arguing that the ‘global narrative of a life is 
structurally unavailable to me’ ( 272-273) for, no one can speak of or from beyond death 
and to speak of death as a narrative end point to a life’s story overlooks this.  
ii Heidegger uses the term Dasein ( in the German ‘Da-sein’ , literally meaning being there)  
to denote human existence. For Heidegger, what individuates us from different beings, 
such as animals for example,  is our capacity to reflect on the very  possibilities of our own 
existence.  He says in Being and Time  [1926]‘Thus to work out the question of Being 
adequately, we must make an entity – the inquirer – transparent in his own Being. […] This 
entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of  
its Being, we shall denote by the term “Dasein”’ ( Heidegger 1962: 27). 
iii For a more developed discussion of this, refer to the work of social theatre practitioner  
Guglielmo Schininà. In his writing about the presumption of post traumatic stress disorder 
following the ‘crisis’ in Kosovo Schininà  describes the ‘unchallenged western presumption 
that there is a universal response to highly stressful events, and that this response can be 
catagorized as a diagnosable form of mental disorder’ (Schininà 2009: 39 – 40) 
iv In other words, a limit experience places limits on experience, it is the point at which 
subjectivity loses its apparent transparency: we cannot penetrate the thought of our own 
deaths. Nevertheless, such a thought produces certain affects within us – Heidegger would 
call these affective comportments, ‘stimmung’ – attunements or moods - and the principal 
mood is one of ‘anxiety’. 
v There is of course something of a paradox here, for whilst the verbatim theatre playwright 
might honour the factual truth of a story, this promise of transparency does not take 
account of the editorial process of selecting, editing and interpreting the material that is 
presented by the verbatim subject. 
vi Shebeen means pub. 
